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a b s t r a c t
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008 triggered monetary policy designed to boost nominal
demand, including ‘Quantitative Easing’, ‘Credit Easing’, ‘Forward Guidance’ and ‘Funding
for Lending’. A key aim of these policies was to boost the quantity of bank credit to the
non-ﬁnancial corporate and household sectors. In the previous decades, however, policy-
makershadnot focusedonbankcredit. Indeed, over thepasthalf century, different variables
were raised to prominence in the quest to achieve desired nominal GDP outcomes. This
paper conducts a long-overdue horse race between the various contenders in terms of
their ability to account for observed nominal GDP growth, using a half-century of UK data
since 1963. Employing the ‘General-to-Speciﬁc’ methodology, an equilibrium-correction
model is estimated suggesting a long-run cointegrating relationship between disaggre-
gated real economy credit and nominal GDP. Short-term and long-term interest rates and
broad money do not appear to inﬂuence nominal GDP signiﬁcantly. Vector autoregression
and vector error correction modelling shows the real economy credit growth variable to
be strongly exogenous to nominal GDP growth. Policy-makers are hence right to ﬁnally
emphasise the role of bank credit, although they need to disaggregate it and speciﬁcally
target bank credit for GDP-transactions.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
One highly useful lesson from the crisis is that although we conventionally use the label “monetary policy” to refer to
themacroeconomic policy that central banks carry out, theway this policyworks revolves around credit, notmoney. . .
In retrospect, the economics profession’s focus on money – meaning various subsets of instruments on the liability
side of the banking system’s balance sheet in contrast to bank assets, and correspondingly the deposit assets on the
public’s balance sheet in contrast to the liabilities that the public issues – turns out to have been a half-century-long
diversion that did not serve our profession well.
Benjamin Friedman (2012:302)
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 23 8059 2549; fax: +44 2380593844.
E-mail address: werner@soton.ac.uk (R.A. Werner).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intﬁn.2016.03.009
1042-4431/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
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Since the ﬁnancial crisis, there has been a revival of interest in macro-ﬁnancial linkages (see, for instance, Love and Ariss,
014). The relationship between monetary policy and nominal output has long been an area of controversy in empirical
acroeconomics and macro ﬁnance.1 Large-scale credit shocks in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis placed the spotlight
n the role of credit supply (Lou and Yin, 2014) and the impact of quantitative stimulation policies, including ‘Quantitative
asing’ (Girardin andMoussa, 2011), ‘Credit Easing’ and ‘Funding for LendingSchemes’ (FLS) (Churmet al., 2012). Thusﬁnance
esearchers have increasingly examined the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission (Nguyen and Boateng,
013), in line with the research programme to place banks more squarely into macroeconomic models and reﬂecting their
acroeconomic effect in ﬁnance models (Werner, 1997, 2005, 2012).
Althoughusually framedasbeingaimedatboostinggrowth,2 thepost-crisismonetarypolicieshave targeted intermediate
ariables, typically medium and long-term interest rates. Empirical studies of QE-type policies have equally focused on such
ariables. This has been criticised (Voutsinas and Werner, 2011; Lyonnet and Werner, 2012; Goodhart and Ashworth, 2012;
artin and Milas, 2012). The focus on intermediate variables means that the effects on the ﬁnal target variable of nominal
DP is hypothesised rather than empirically tested – using concepts such as ‘portfolio rebalancing’ (Section 2.2).
Another problem with existing studies is the time period over which analysis is conducted. Many studies, in particular
vent studies, focus on the crisis and post-crisis period, a time of extraordinary economic and ﬁnancial dislocation, which
reates counterfactual and attribution problems and may fail to capture typical macroeconomic lag dynamics.
A third problem is that many studies do not include credit aggregates or distinguish where credit ﬂows in the economy.
his is a criticism that has also been levelled at macroeconomic theory and macroeconomic models more generally, most
f which excluded a signiﬁcant role for money, credit or banks (Buiter, 2008; Goodhart, 2009; Turner, 2013a). This fact may
elp explain their failure to predict the ﬁnancial crisis which has been linked to a credit boom in the US and UK housing
arkets (Bezemer, 2009; Stiglitz, 2011). It is even argued that virtually all boom-bust cycles are due to bank credit growth
or non-GDP transactions (the ‘Quantity Theory of Credit’, Werner, 1997, 2012).
Recently,more studies have demonstrated a link betweenmonetary aggregates and output in general (Sousa and Zaghini,
007), and, speciﬁcally, between credit and ﬁnancial crises, asset price bubbles and output (Hume and Sentance, 2009;
chularick and Taylor, 2009; Cappiello et al., 2010; Barnett and Thomas, 2013; Aikman et al., 2014). Rondorf (2012) and
eroy (2014) showed that in Europe bank loans are important for output growth. In addition, the Bank of England and UK
reasury have initiated policies designed to boost particular forms of credit such as ‘Funding for Lending’ to support small
usinesses (Churm et al., 2012). Related policies have been adopted by the Bank of Japan (2014) and the European Central
ank (2014).
At the same time, central banks have also begun (re-)introducing policies aimed at restricting certain forms of credit.
n particular, ‘macroprudential’ policies have been introduced to reduce mortgage lending. For example, in June 2014, the
rst limits on the UK mortgage market in 30 years were implemented by the Bank of England and its new Financial Policy
ommittee, restricting the amount that homeowners can borrow relative to their income.3
This paper is an empirical study of monetary policy in the United Kingdom which focuses on the above mentioned issues.
t conducts a horse race between potential variables that have in the past been identiﬁed by policy-makers as important in
rder to inﬂuence nominal GDP. Firstly, we examine the impact of various different monetary policy variables, including a
eal-economydisaggregated credit variable, in a general unrestricted single-equationmodelwithnominalGDPgrowthas the
ependent variable.4 Following Werner (1997) and Lyonnet and Werner (2012), this allows competing theories, including
he monetarist and Keynesian theories, as well as the Quantity Theory of Credit to be tested in a competitive setting. Thus
e also include short- and long-term interest rates and a broad money aggregate to represent alternative explanations of
he monetary transmission mechanism. Secondly, we use a quarterly time series from 1963q1 (when accurate quarterly
onetary aggregate series ﬁrst become available) to 2012q4 (199 observations) to test our hypotheses against multiple
egime shifts, time dynamics and effects of shocks. We model location shifts using impulse and step-indicator dummy
aturation techniques.Given the failure of hypothetico-deductive equilibrium-based models to predict the ﬁnancial crisis, including those
elying on rational expectations and modelling the ﬁnancial sector as a ‘friction’ (Drifﬁll, 2011; Goodhart, 2009) we adopt
n inductive methodology (Werner, 2005, 2011). Speciﬁcally, we employ the ‘General-to-Speciﬁc’ OLS econometric method
1 For much of the second half of the 20th century this question was dominated by the debate between Keynesian and Monetarist schools, with the former
ownplaying the role of money in favour of emphasis on ﬁscal policy counter-balancing private sector ﬂuctuations, whilst monetarists, following Friedman
nd Schwartz (1963) emphasised the importance of deposit aggregates in determining output and inﬂation – see Johnson (1971). While much analysis has
ocused on industrialised economies, recently research analysing these issues in emerging markets has also appeared (Mehrotra and Sánchez-Fung, 2011;
ueker and Kim, 1999).
2 The Bank of England has been explicit in stating the purpose of its QE programme was to “increase nominal spending growth” in order to maintain
nﬂation at the 2% target (Joyce et al., 2011:1, as quoted by Voutsinas and Werner, 2011 and Lyonnet and Werner, 2012); see also the Bank’s short ﬁlm,
Quantitative Easing Explained’, available online at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/pages/qe/default.aspx.
3 See Bank of England (2014), Executive Summary, p. 1, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/fsr/2014/fsr35.aspx (accessed
5.08.14).
4 This follows the approach of Werner (1997) and Voutsinas and Werner (2011) on Japan and Lyonnet and Werner (2012) on the UK, the latter of whom
xamined a shorter series from 1995 to 2010 using a wider range of variables and with the single-equation method only. Nominal GDP is a widely accepted
nal target variable for central banks and many economists and commentators have argued it should be used instead of inﬂation – see e.g. McCallum and
elson (1999), Romer (2011), Sumner (2012) and even Woodford (2014).
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(following Hendry and Mizon, 1978) to test the relative strength of the correlation of the different variables with nominal
GDP. We develop a single equation error-correction model (ECM) which ﬁnds a long-run cointegrating relationship between
growth in GDP and credit to non-ﬁnancial corporations and households (the ‘real economy’). Changes to short- and long-
term interest rates play a less signiﬁcant role in the model with only a very small coefﬁcient. We ﬁnd similar results when
we re-estimate the model in the vector autoregressive/vector error correction (VECM) format. We tackle the problem of
simultaneity between nominal GDP and credit with exogeneity and augmented Granger causality tests, ﬁnding support for
unidirectional causation from credit to GDP, and hence for the Quantity Theory of Credit.
The paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 reviews existing theories of the monetary policy transmission mechanism,
focusing on recent developments such asQE and related unconventionalmonetary policy interventions since the 2007–2008
crisis. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology, data and related modelling decisions. Section 4 describes the results
of the single equation ECM and VAR/VECM models. Section 5 concludes with implications for policy and suggestions for
further research.
2. Developments in monetary policy theory and practise
Monetary policy – and the theory behind it – has undergone considerable change over the past half century. In the 1960s
and early 1970s, central banks had multiple targets, paid close attention to the bank lending channel in the UK and many
other western economies, with credit controls and credit guidance commonplace, either explicitly in the form of quotas or
more implicitly via ‘moral suasion’ (Hodgman, 1973; U.S. Congress, 1981; Goodhart, 1989:157–163).
In the 1970s, policy was inﬂuenced by monetarist theories which focused on the demand for bank liabilities (money)
rather than the creation of bank assets (credit) as the key macroeconomic variable inﬂuencing consumption and nominal
demand (Friedman and Meiselman, 1963; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). However, these models were criticised for failing
to establish causality (as opposed to correlation) between these variables and neglecting simultaneity and omitted variable
bias (Ando and Modigliani, 1965; Kaldor, 1970). In addition, attempts to implement monetarist policies, via explicit targets
of monetary (but not credit) aggregates, were largely unsuccessful in terms of stabilising inﬂation or nominal demand.
In the 1980s, inﬂuenced by the Lucas (1976) critique that the parameters of standard structural equation models of the
macroeconomy were not policy-invariant, there was a shift towards models with microfoundations where expectations
could be more explicitly incorporated. Coupled with the apparent failure of Keynesian stabilisation policies to deal with the
supply side shocks of the1970s, this ledmacroeconomics to turndecisively towards ahypothetico-deductivemethodological
approach (Werner, 2005;Drifﬁll, 2011;Werner, 2011). Tomake suchmicro-foundedmodels tractable, it is thought necessary
to involve hypothesised universal rules – or axioms – about the functioning of agents in the economy. These include the
existence of representative agents with rational expectations operating in rich information environments with near-perfect
foresight and frictionless or complete market clearing (Lucas, 1972; Phelps, 1973; Sargent and Wallace, 1975).
This new approach did not lead to an abandonment of the focus on money and the liabilities’ side of bank’s balance
sheets, however. The ﬁnancial innovations of the 1980s were perceived by some economists as one reason for the observed
breakdown in the relationship between money on the one hand and inﬂation and output on the other, as a range of new
forms of tradeable assets emerged that were seen to be potential substitutes for money, such as bonds and non-bank credit.
Developing earlier equilibrium portfolio optimising models, ‘New-Keynesian’ or ‘New Macroeconomic Consensus’5 (NMC)
approaches advised that monetary policy should move away from quantities and onto the price of money – interest rates –
mainly through central banks’ role in setting the nominal short-term interest rate or ‘base rate’ (Clarida et al., 1999; most
notably Woodford, 2003; see also Arestis, 2011).
Empirical support for this approach came from studies using vector autoregression (VAR) models which showed that
monetary aggregates’ inﬂuence on output was signiﬁcantly lessoned when the short-term real interest rate was introduced
(Sims, 1980; Litterman and Weiss, 1983). This ‘Real-Business Cycle’ approach downplayed any signiﬁcant role for monetary
policy outside adjustments to interest rates. The monetarist focus on inﬂation has remained, however, and explicit inﬂation-
targeting, baseduponpublically known rules to guide expectations, over andaboveothermacroeconomic objectives, became
the norm in the 1990s period in many developed countries.
2.1. Banks and credit as ﬁnancial ‘frictions‘
The modelling of monetary policy since the late 1980s, following Bernanke and Blinder (1989), has incorporated credit,
banks and balance sheets primarily as ‘ﬁnancial frictions’ within micro-founded, equilibrium based frameworks. In such
models, economic shocks can be ampliﬁed via the ‘credit channel’, ‘bank lending channel’, ‘balance sheet channel’ or
‘ﬁnancial-accelerator’ (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and Stein, 1994; Bernanke et al., 1999), potentially over long
periods. Changes in credit are not seen as exogenously causing shocks or major changes to output or inﬂation, however. As
Bernanke and Gertler (1995:28) state, “the credit channel is an enhancement mechanism, not a truly independent or parallel
channel.” The typical empirical approach involves setting up speciﬁc structural models and then calibrating these with data
to see if they appear accurate or estimating structural vector autoregression models (SVARs) representing reduced forms of
5 Sometimes also referred to as ‘New Neoclassical consensus’ or ‘New Consensus Macroeconomics’.
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hese models and testing whether particular restrictions associated with different channels of monetary policy are satisﬁed
n the face of exogenous shocks. This is an example of a speciﬁc-to-general empirical approach.
In a post-crisis review of the quantitative performance of a range of different New-Keynesian models with ﬁnancial
rictions, including SVARs, Quadrini (2011), found that most such models were unable to predict ﬂuctuations on the scale
bserved in reality. One reason for this was that the asset price variations which resulted from such models – and thus the
hanges in resulting borrower or intermediary net worth – are far smaller than observed in regular real world cycles. In
ddition, the ﬁnancial crisis appeared to be a case of the ﬁnancial sector generating a shock, rather than amplifying a shock
enerated from the real economy. As former Governor of the BoE Mervyn King (2012:14) has noted:
The only way the addition of a ﬁnancial sector ‘matters’ in these models is if we contemplate exogenous shocks to the
ﬁnancial friction itself. That is not very instructive. . .there seems no limit to the ingenuity of economists to identify
such market failures, but not one of these frictions seems large enough to play a part in a macroeconomic model of
ﬁnancial stability.
.2. Quantitative Easing and the ‘Portfolio Channel’
With the onset of the 2007–2008 crisis, monetary policy announcements underwent major innovations. With short-term
ase-rates having reached the ‘zero-lower bound’ without visibly stimulating economies after the ﬁnancial crisis, central
anks engaged in large-scale purchases of long-dated assets to push down medium and long-term interest rates. Three
ain channels or ‘transmission mechanisms’ can be identiﬁed in the literature via which this version of ‘QE’ is said to make
n impact on the economy (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004; Bowdler and Radia, 2012).6 Firstly, as commercial banks hold
igniﬁcantly higher levels of central bank reserves due to ‘QE’, it is argued that additional liquidity and reduced cost of
unding enables them to increase their lending to the real economy (with some authors even suggesting that banks can ‘lend
ut’ those excess reserves- see for instance Agenor et al., 2004). In the UK, the ﬁrst phase of QE in 2009, when £200 billion
as injected in the space of just six months, is said to have supported bank lending, or at least prevented a further fall in
redit creation, although the Bank of England has played down this effect in its analysis (Bowdler and Radia, 2012).7
Secondly, the purchase of gilts from ﬁnancial investors by the central bank results in the replacement of longer term
igher yielding assets with more liquid but low yielding assets (deposits).8 It is hoped that investors will rebalance their
oldings by seeking out similar kinds of ﬁnancial assets, in particular corporate assets – bonds or equities (shares) – that
ill in turn support businesses operating in the real economy. For larger ﬁrms in particular, capital markets are considered
o be an important substitute for bank credit. Both Keynesians (Tobin, 1969) and monetarists (Brunner and Meltzer, 1973)
ave in the past argued for such a portfolio substitution effect.
A thirdpotential consequenceof portfolio rebalancing is the ‘wealth effect’. This beneﬁts banks, as the valueof their capital
ises. They may then pass this on via charging lower interest rates. The Bank of England has downplayed such an impact,
oo, arguing that the banking sector has been too severely damaged by the crisis for this to make a signiﬁcant difference
Bowdler and Radia, 2012). There may also be a wealth effect for households if banks do increase lending against property,
esulting in house price-rises. There is evidence that house prices play a signiﬁcant role in the monetary policy transmission
echanism in the UK via consumption-collateral effects (Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008; Aron et al., 2012).
.3. A credit theory of money
It is now widely accepted that in modern economies, banks create money (deposits) when they expand their balance
heets in the act of lending (Werner, 2014b; Mcleay et al., 2014; Ryan-Collins et al., 2011; Werner, 1997). In this sense
ending actually precedes savings and credit creation precedes and determines money balances (Caporale and Howells,
001). Credit creation can thus be understood as an expansion of purchasing power and the ﬂows of new credit-money shape
he macroeconomic trajectory of the economy – they have ‘real’ effects. This ‘credit theory of money’ has a long historical
radition (Innes, 1914; Keynes, 1930; Fisher, 1933; Schumpeter, 1983 [1911]; Minsky, 1986; Werner, 1997). Schumpeter
tressed the role of the ‘deposit-creating bank’ in ‘ﬁnancing investment without any previous saving up of the sums thus lent’
1994 [1954]:1114–1115, italics in original). Similarly, Keynes noted that ‘credit expansion provides not an alternative to
ncreased saving but a necessary preparation for it. It is the parent, not the twin of increased saving.’ (Keynes, 1939:572).
It has been noted in the literature that credit and banking crises tend to result in longer and more severe recessions or
epressions than non-monetary crises (Kindleberger and Laffargue, 1982; Borio and Lowe, 2004; Jordà et al., 2011; Aikman
6 The authors also identify a fourth – via expectations, analysed via event studies linked to policy announcements. QE has been implemented differently
n different countries with different types of assets purchased by central banks. For an international review see (Joyce et al., 2012).
7 A number of other schemes aimed more directly at improving banks’ balance sheets were also underway at the time, including the government
uaranteeing bonds issued by the banks (the credit guarantee scheme), the SLS, and the partial nationalisations of RBS and Lloyds Bank via massive tax-
ayer-funded re-capitalisations. These interventionswould appear to support thebanking systemmoredirectly andhencemayprevent further contractions
n lending.
8 Aswell as seeking higher yielding assets, certain kinds of investors, in particular pension funds, will want to hold assets of longermaturity than deposits
s they have correspondingly long-dated liabilities.
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et al., 2014). The idea that credit shocks can have a macroeconomic impact on the economy that is independent of broader
aggregate demand shocks rests upon the existence of supply-side credit rationing (Keeton, 1979; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981,
1992) by banks independently of the state of demand, combined with the role of banks as creators of the money supply
(Werner, 1997).
A recenthistorical studyby theBankof England,whichuseda credit variable in the contextof a six-variable StructuralVAR,
found that between a third and a half of the fall in GDP relative to its historic trend can be attributed to credit supply shocks
and a much weaker role for aggregate demand shocks (Barnett and Thomas, 2013). A study of Spanish bank lending used
individual loan application data and controlled for the quality of ﬁrm, time of applications, general economic conditions
and monetary policy interventions, was able to exclude reverse causality and found robust statistical evidence of credit
rationing over the 2002–2008 period of economic expansion in Spain (Jiménez et al., 2012:6). Similarly, a panel study of
the eurozone area which used shocks to money demand as an instrument for bank lending concluded that a change in loan
growth has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect on GDP. . . and underpins the reasoning behind giving monetary and
credit analysis a prominent role in the monetary policy strategy of the ECB (Ciccarelli et al., 2010:6).
Whilst in monetarist and New-Keynesian perspectives an implicit assumption is often made that all credit ﬂows to the
real (productive) economy, a signiﬁcant proportion of bank credit may ﬂow into existing ﬁnancial assets, for example land
or property or ﬁnancial commodities. The inﬂuence of such credit ﬂows on economic growth is at best indirect, since they
are more likely to result in asset price inﬂation rather than new GDP-transactions. This distinction was recognised by Fisher,
2006 [1911] and also by Keynes, who related that whilst income transactions might be closely related to GDP, transactions
in assets
“. . .need not be, and are not, governed by the volume of current output. The pace at which a circle of ﬁnanciers,
speculators and investors hand round to one another particular pieces of wealth, or title to such, which they are
neither producing nor consuming but merely exchanging, bears no deﬁnite relation to the rate of current production.
The volume of such transactions is subject to very wide and incalculable ﬂuctuations. . .” (Keynes, 1971:vol. 5, p. 42)
Werner (1997) develops a formal model of disaggregated credit that enhances Fisher’s (2006 [1911]) original ‘equation
of exchange’. In this ‘Quantity Theory of Credit’, Fisher’s stock measure of money M is replaced by a credit aggregate that
itself is split into separate credit ﬂow aggregates so that it can be seen that only credit created for real-economy transactions
contributes to GDP growth, in contrast to credit created for asset transactions. Werner (1997, 2005) provides empirical
evidence from Japan that disaggregated credit to the non-ﬁnancial private sector is a strong predictor of nominal GDP
growth and helps explain long-term macroeconomic puzzles, such as the secular decline in the velocity of money and asset
price bubbles and crises. Further empirical evidence consistent with the Quantity Theory of Credit is cited in Werner (2012).
Moreover, Werner (2014a) found that credit creation for GDP transactions in eurozone member Spain are a signiﬁcant
explanatory variable of nominal GDP growth, while government expenditure not backed by bank credit creation crowds out
private demand, so that switching frombond issuance to government borrowing frombanks via loan contracts is an effective
and simple government policy (dubbed ‘Enhanced Debt Management’) to create a sustainable recovery in countries such as
Spain and Greece.
Other disaggregated credit panel studies have also found a stronger correlation between credit to the non-ﬁnancial
corporate sector and economic growth than credit to the household sector (Beck et al., 2008; Büyükkarabacak and Valev,
2010; Bezemer et al., 2016). In the UK case, empirical studies suggest household lending is an important contributor to
GDP growth via consumption since the credit liberalisation of the early 1980s (Muellbauer, 2009; Aron et al., 2012) – a
point further developed in Section 3.2. These reforms allowed previously credit-constrained property-owning households
to borrow for consumption purposes, using their homes as collateral. Moreover, Lyonnet and Werner (2012) found that a
general model of UK nominal GDP growth can be simpliﬁed in a sequential reduction to a parsimonious form that reveals
bank credit to the real economy as the main explanatory variable.
3. Modelling approach and data
3.1. The ‘General to Speciﬁc’ method, cointegration and exogeneity testing
Given the competing theories described above we should be wary of a priori theoretical assumptions and restrictions
whenestimating an empiricalmodel. Following Lyonnet andWerner (2012),we instead adopt the ‘General to Speciﬁc’ (GETS)
methodology (Hendry, 1995; Mizon, 1995; Campos et al., 2005), which is akin to an inductive approach to econometric
testing. We commence with a general unrestricted model (GUM) which embeds the competing economic theories of the
monetary transmissionmechanism.TheGUMshouldbe congruent, i.e. statistically valid, see, e.g. BontempsandMizon (2008).
Selection is undertaken on the GUMby undertaking valid reductions of themodel to a parsimonious congruent speciﬁcation.
We utilise the ‘Autometrics’ search algorithm, which uses a tree-search to detect and eliminate statistically-insigniﬁcant
variables (Doornik, 2009).9
9 Monte Carlo tests show that GETS selection from the GUM recovers the DGP from large equations with a size and power close to commencing the
search from the DGP itself (Hendry and Krolzig, 2005).
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The single equation GUM is an Autoregressive Distributed Lag model of the general form:
yt =
J∑
i=1
˛iyt−i +
N∑
k=1
J∑
i=0
ˇ′kixk,t−i +
T∑
i=1
ıi1[t=ti] +
T∑
i=2
iS[t=ti] + εi (1)
where xt = (x1,t, . . ., xN,t) is an (N×1) vector of potential explanatory variables,
∑T
i=11[t=ti] is a set of saturating indicators
eﬁned by 1[t=j] = 1 for observation t= j, and zero otherwise and
∑T
i=2S[t=ti] is a set of saturating step dummies deﬁned by
[t≤j] = 1 for observations up to j, and 0 otherwise, J is the maximum lag length and εt is a white noise, serially uncorrelated
rror: εt∼IN[0, 2ε ] for t=1, . . ., T .
Once a congruent GUMhas been identiﬁed, a speciﬁc, parsimoniousmodel is then estimated via valid reductions based on
tatistical signiﬁcance fromthegeneralmodel, allowing conditioningof later inferenceson the congruentmodel speciﬁcation
s the best representative of the DGP. By including relevant variables, the GETS approach allows monetarist (monetary
ggregates), New-Keynesian (short-term interest rates),more recent central bank portfolio- andwealth-channel approaches
long-term interest rates) and Quantity Theory of Credit perspectives (disaggregated credit ﬂows), to be equally represented
nd encompassed in the GUM (Section 3.2).
.1.1. Vector autoregression, vector error correction models and testing for exogeneity
Single-equation modelling imposes assumptions about the exogeneity of the regressors. If there is contemporaneous
eedback between variables such as output, interest rates and monetary or credit aggregates, as agents in the economy
eact to changing conditions or alter their expectations (Lucas, 1976), then a multivariate framework is required. As the
ontemporaneous values of the regressors are included in the single equation model we test the exogeneity assumption
sing a Vector autoregressive (VAR) model, following Engle et al. (1983), in order to establish whether a single equation
nalysis is valid.
Consider a p-dimensional VAR with linear deterministic terms for yt, where yt is a vector of endogenous variables at time
:
yt = ˘yt−1 +
J−1∑
i=1
iyt−i +  + ıt + εt (2)
where εt ∼ INp[0, ˙], for t=1, . . ., T. The starting values (y1−J, . . ., y0) are ﬁxed,  i are (p×p) matrices and ˘ =˛ˇ′, where
and ˇ are (p× r) matrices of full rank. For I(1) cointegration analysis we require the roots of the characteristic polynomial
o lie on or outside the unit circle, and we require the reduced rank condition for yt to be I(1) with r cointegrating vectors
iven by:
rank(˛′⊥ˇ⊥) = p − r
where ˛⊥ and ˇ⊥ are orthogonal complements deﬁned as [p× (p× r)] matrices such that ˛′⊥˛⊥ = 0 and (˛, ˛⊥) has full
ank, and similarly (˛′⊥ˇ⊥) has full rank.
.2. Data choices
Theoriginal data set runs from1963(q1)-2012(q4). Thedata is non-seasonally adjusted and in levels.Weuse year-on-year
YoY) growth rates to de-seasonalise the data and concentrate on the medium term dynamics.10 Our dependent variable is
ominal GDP (YoYGDP) and we have four conditional variables: Broad Money (YoYBroadmoney), long- (LT Rate) and short-
erm interest rates (Bankrate) and the variable for credit to the real economy (YoYCreditRE). All data are quarterly since this
s the most frequent period available for the variable of interest, nominal GDP. Where data were only available in weekly or
onthly frequency, we used the value at the end of every quarter, or the average monthly or weekly value in the month or
eek closest to the end of the respective quarter (exact periods are speciﬁed in Table 1 with full list of all variables, their
onstruction and sources).
As already noted, the Bank of England changed the main tools of monetary policy a number of times over the time period
n question (credit quantities, monetary aggregates, short-term/long-term interest rates) and its mandate also changed
igniﬁcantly. Hence it is not possible to identify a consistent approach to targetting during the period in question – thismight
e possible for a shorter time period. Moreover, the point of this empirical test is to let the data tell us what kind of monetary
olicy tool and approach (monetarist, Keynesian, etc.) is more conducive to stimulate and stabilise nominal GDP growth.
Inﬂation is not included as a separate variable in the model, for a number of reasons: Monetary authorities and decision-
akers in the economy are exposed to contemporaneous information on nominal, rather than real variables, and entering
nto contracts denominated in nominal, not real terms. Second, just including the UK Consumer Price Index (CPI) would bias
10 As noted by CobhamandKang (2012), seasonal adjustment techniques ofmonetary data remain under discussion – see e.g. Hussain andMaitland-Smith
2003).
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Table 1
Data summary.
Variable name and
abbreviation
Hypothesised effect Series name (BoE unless speciﬁed) Period Code (BoE
interactive database
code unless stated)
Year-on-year nominal GDP
(YoYGDP)
n/a ONS: Total gross ﬁnal expenditure
(aligned – P.3 +P.5 +P.6: CP
NSA)− (minus) Imports: Total Trade
in Goods & Services: CP NSA+ (plus)
Statistical Discrepancy Gross
Domestic Product: CP NSA
End of quarter ONS codes:
ABMD
BKTL
RVFD
DMUN
Short-term interest rate
(Bankrate)
Standard monetary policy
impact – reduction in base rate
leads to increased demand and
supply of credit and higher
investment, hence growth
Quarterly average of ofﬁcial bank rate
divided by 100
Quarterly average IUQABEDR
Long-term Interest rate
(LT Rate)
Reduction in bond yields
induces portfolio rebalancing
and wealth effects
10-year nominal zero-coupon bond
yield from British Government
Securities
End of quarter IUQMNZC
Year-on-year growth rate
of broad money – the
broadest deposit
aggregate
(YoYBroadmoney)
Increase in broad money will
have portfolio rebalancing
effects as investors switch out
of deposits and in to higher
yielding corporate assets.
1963(Q2)–1995(Q3): Quarterly
amounts outstanding of monetary
ﬁnancial institutions sterling M4
liabilities to private sector: (other
ﬁnancial corporations +private
non-ﬁnancial corporations +
household sector);
1995(Q4):2013(Q2) – recursive
addition of break adjusted quarterly
changes (ﬂows) of M4 liabilities to
the private sector to 1995(Q3) level.
End of quarter LPQAUYM
LPQAUZI
Year-on-year growth rate
of bank credit to the real
economy (excluding the
effects of securitisation)
(YoYCreditRE)
Credit creation by banks for
GDP transactions is necessary
and sufﬁcient for nominal GDP
growth to occur.
Quarterly amounts outstanding of
monetary ﬁnancial institutions
sterling M4 net lending to private
non-ﬁnancial corporations + total
household sector + recursive addition
of break adjusted quarterly changes
End of quarter LPQB9Y2+LPQBD68
LPQB9Y3+LPQB8Y8(ﬂows) to M4 net lending to
non-ﬁnancial sector and household
sector (to 1963q2 level).
our model towards adjustments in the prices of goods and services but exclude changes in asset prices. Third, since the CPI
is highly correlated with the GDP deﬂator, and since the latter is not only correlated with nominal GDP but is a component
of it, an inclusion of the CPI or RPI would bias the results.
For nominal monetary and disaggregated credit aggregates a new time series was constructed as the Bank of England
does not publish unbroken measures back to 1963. The details with codes are provided in Table 1 above. For money, the
Bank of England’s ‘Broadmoney’ (previously M4) measure was used. For the disaggregated credit series, we use lending to
Private-Non-Financial-Corporations (PNFCs) and lending to Households, following Lyonnet and Werner (2012). Lending to
other ﬁnancial corporations (OFCs) is thus excluded from thismeasure as our hypothesis is that such loanswill not contribute
to GDP-transactions. As shown in Figs. 1 and 2, lending to OFCs is highly volatile and there was a massive build-up in this
type of lending prior to the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007–2008.
Although a large proportion of lending to households will be for mortgages and hence may result in asset-price inﬂation
rather than contributing to GDP-transactions, deregulation of the credit-market in the 1980s enabled households to borrow
against the value of their homes – via home equity withdrawal – for consumption smoothing purposes (Muellbauer, 2002).
House-price inﬂation is also thought to have asymmetric ‘wealth effects’ which will also stimulate consumption (Goodhart
and Hofmann, 2008; Aron et al., 2012).11 As shown in Fig. 2, there was a rapid rise in household lending as a proportion of
GDP from the 1980s in contrast to lending to the private non-ﬁnancial sector. Fig. 1 demonstrates the growth rate of lending
to households is considerably smoother than lending to private non-ﬁnancial corporations, supporting the idea that it plays
an important role in dampening this pro-cyclicality.In the late 1990s and 2000s, there were a number of changes to monetary and credit aggregates caused by changes to
the Bank of England’s deﬁnitions of banks and building societies, EU reporting requirements and bank failures and mergers,
in particular during and following the ﬁnancial crisis. These changes, some of which ran into billions, are not captured in
11 Another formof lending that likely contributes to bothGDP transactions and asset-prices is commercial real estate lending,whichmakes up a signiﬁcant
proportion of lending to non-ﬁnancial corporations. Again, however, it is difﬁcult to disentangle the effects. One option would have been to use the Bank of
England’s ‘industrial Analysis of MFI lending’ series – see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/pages/iadb/notesiadb/industrial.aspx – which would
have enabled the removal of commercial real estate lending. However, this series is only available back to 1986 and excludes non-UK bank sterling lending.
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he Bank of England’s levels data but are captured in the Bank’s ‘quarterly changes to amounts outstanding’ or ‘ﬂows’ data
eries.12 For both Broadmoney and Credit to the Real Economy (CreditRE), we create new, break-adjusted levels’ series by
ndexing against the 1963q1 level.13 This gives a more accurate picture of the dynamics in monetary aggregates over time
nd avoids the use of dummies relating to deﬁnitional changes for this period.
Prior to Q2 1975, the Bank of England did not include data on unsecured lending to households, lending to non-
ncorporated companies or not-for-proﬁt institutions serving households (NPISH) in its measures of lending to the
12 See Bank of England, ‘Changes, ﬂows and growth rates’, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/pages/iadb/notesiadb/changes ﬂows growth
ates.aspx (accessed 16.12.13).
13 The 1963q2 level is thus the addition of the real 1963q1 level and the 1963q1 corresponding change (or ‘ﬂow’), the 1963q3 level is the new 1963q2
dded to the 1963q2 change and so on.
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economy.14 The ﬁgure for credit to the real economy 1963q1-1975q1 thus includes an estimate of these categories. The
ﬁgure is a residual derived from subtracting lending to Other Financial Corporations from the Bank’s ‘Total Private sector
credit’ aggregatewhichdoes include these categories.15 Finally,we exclude the effect of securitisation fromcredit andmoney
series following the Bank of England’s methodology.
3.3. Stationarity, cointegration and structural breaks
Pre-estimate ocular examination suggested none of the variables were stationary in their levels and there was evidence
of exponential trends. To remove trends and de-seasonalise the data, four-quarter or year-on-year (YoY) growth rates were
taken for all data series:
YoYx = (xt − xt−4)
xt−4
(3)
This is the close approximate equivalent of the taking the seasonal (t−4) difference of the log of each variable (Charemza
and Deadman, 1992:38). Unit-root testing of the growth rates, using the Phillips–Perron (1988) approach that accounts for
structural breaks showed that all YoY variables were I(1). Results are available on request.
The GUM is initially speciﬁed in YoY growth rates with ﬁve lags of each variable. This is sufﬁcient to eliminate residual
autocorrelation. Selection tests remain valid with integrated data and most diagnostic tests, excluding heteroskedasticity,
also remain valid (Sims et al., 1990; Wooldridge, 1999).
Fig. 3 shows that there was considerable volatility in the growth rate series in the 1970s and early 1980s periods.
In terms of international shocks, the period saw the collapse of the Bretton Woods ﬁxed exchange rate regime and
two major oil shocks. There was also signiﬁcant domestic deregulation, with the Competition, Credit and Control Act
of 1971 marking a shift away from quantitative controls on credit towards price via interest rate adjustments and, in
1979, the lifting of exchange controls, opening the banking sector to greater foreign competition and giving domestic
institutions access to the developing Eurodollar markets. Banks were permitted to enter the mortgage market from 1980
and mortgage lending signiﬁcantly liberalised, enabling consumption smoothing via home equity withdrawal (Aron et al.,
2012).16
Attempting to model so many shocks and regime shifts is challenging. Rather than selectively adding dummies for
obvious outlying residuals – of which there were many–the method of ‘indicator-saturation’ was adopted following Hendry
14 See ‘New Banking Statistics’, article in Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q2, 1975, pp162-165, available online at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
archive/Documents/historicpubs/qb/1975/qb75q2162165.pdf.
15 This decision followed consultation with the Bank of England (16th January 2014) – email correspondence.
16 In a comparative study of the relationship between credit, housing collateral and consumption, Aron et al. (2012) report that in the UK, prior to
the liberalisation of credit in the early 1980s, they ﬁnd no evidence of a relationship between consumption-to-income and housing wealth-to-income
ratios. Post-credit liberalisation, however, consumption becomes less volatile and clearly correlated with household wealth, providing strong evidence of
a consumption smoothing collateral channel. See also Goodhart and Hofmann (2008).
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t al. (2008) which involves adding an indicator variable for each observation. Castle et al. (2012) and Hendry et al. (2008)
utline the procedure in which selection eliminates the statistically insigniﬁcant indicators and retains the most signiﬁcant.
ohansen and Nielsen (2009) show that under the null that there are no outliers, ˛T indicators will be retained on average for
signiﬁcance level ˛, and simulations under the alternative demonstrate a high power for location shifts, even in dynamic
odels. Steps are also included to detect location shifts, denoted step-indicator saturation (Castle et al., 2015).
. Empirical results
.1. Single equation model
Rather than jointly selecting the relevant indicators and step-dummies with the variables, we ﬁrst apply step- and
ndicator-saturation to the GUM with all regressors held ﬁxed with ﬁve lags. Selection of the indicators is undertaken
t the 2.5% signiﬁcance level. This yielded three impulse indicators – for 1975q1, 1979q1 and 1979q3 – and three step-
ndicators, indicating location shifts, for 1974q1, 1976q4and1981q2. These indicatorsmatchwith theoil shocks andﬁnancial
iberalisation policy changes described above.
We add the indicator variables to our GUM and ﬁnd a well-speciﬁed general model. The general model in year-on-year
rowth rates with YoYGDP as the dependent variable is estimated over 1965q2-2012q4, and includes 5 lags of all condition-
ng variables, 5 lags of the dependent variable, and the 6 indicators listed above. The GUM delivers an equation standard
rror of 1.3% and passes all the standard statistical tests relating to autoregressive errors (AR 1–5 test), autoregressive con-
itional heteroskedasticity (ARCH 1–4), normality, White’s tests for heteroskedasticity (Hetero), Ramsey’s Reset test for
unctional form, and Chow test for a break after 1998q4. Graphical inspection (Fig. 4) shows a good ﬁt of the scaled resid-
als (r), residual distribution and autocorrelation function (ACF), conﬁrming the model is robust. (Full results available on
equest.)
Selection is applied using PCGive’s Autometrics software at a 5% signiﬁcance level. The ﬁnal selected model is reported
elow,where ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level and *** signiﬁcance at the 1% level. (The full reduction process is available
n request). The model passes all diagnostic tests (i.e. congruence is maintained) and the equation standard error is close to
hat of the GUM at 1.4%.
Concerning a potential impact of the UK leaving the EU, two insights can be gleaned from our empirical ﬁndings: Firstly,
he empirical methodology to detect structural breaks found no such break in the determinants of nominal GDP growth
hen the UK joined the EU in Q1 1973. However, it is noticeable that the most signiﬁcant dummy variable is a step dummy
tarting from Q1 1974, which could reﬂect the delayed economic impact of EU entry. It is highly signiﬁcant and has a
egative sign (see Tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). Secondly, UK nominal GDP growth is to a large extent determined by domestic
actors. Bank credit for GDP transactions (called CR in the Quantity Theory of Credit; in this case speciﬁcally mortgage credit
nd credit to non-ﬁnancial corporations) is the most important target for monetary policy in order to achieve a particular
ominal GDP growth rate. Policies to enhance such bank credit can and should be taken, irrespective of international trade
r political union arrangements.
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4.1.1. Parsimonious I(1) single equation model
OLS, using observations 1965:2–2012:4 (T=191)
Dependent variable: YoYGDP
ˇ t-ratio
Const 0.01*** 3.10
YoYCreditRE 0.23*** 5.26
YoYCreditRE 2 −0.39*** −3.72
YoYCreditRE 3 0.51*** 4.79
YoYCreditRE 5 −0.26*** −5.58
LT RATE 1 0.00*** 5.41
ImpD 1975 1 0.04** 2.34
ImpD 1979 1 −0.03** −2.44
ImpD 1979 3 0.05*** 3.39
StepD 1974 1 −0.07*** −9.36
StepD 1976 4 0.04*** 6.40
StepD 1981 2 0.04*** 6.96
YoYGDP 1 0.51*** 9.85
YoYGDP 2 0.20*** 3.60
YoYGDP 4 −0.41*** −8.57
SE of regression 0.014
Adjusted R-squared 0.92
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Growth of Broadmoney and short-term interest rates are ejected from our parsimonious model and whilst the long-term
rate is retained, it has the opposite sign to what might be expected (positive rather than negative, see Werner, 2005) and
a very weak coefﬁcient. By contrast, the growth rate of credit to the real economy (YoYCreditRE) is highly signiﬁcant with
a net coefﬁcient of 13%. Lags of GDP are also signiﬁcant with a net coefﬁcient of 30%. From this parsimonious model we can
deduce a dynamic short run Error Correction Term which shows a strong relationship between YoYGDP and YoYCreditRE:
ECM = YoYGDP − 0.015 − 0.132 × YoYCreditRE − 0.0048 × LT Rate (4)
ADF cointegration tests show the ECM to be stationary at the 1% signiﬁcance level with the indicators included and at
the 5% level with the indicators excluded (Fig. 5 – top graph).
We then transform the GUM to I(0) space by differencing and including the lagged ECM. Rather than including the
indicators with restrictions in the cointegrating space, the ECM is entered excluding the indicators and the six indicators
are included separately so they enter without restrictions. Note that there are now 4 lags of the differences of each variable.
We drop Bankrate and Broadmoney from the GUM, as they were dropped from our I(1) GUM but include the same set of
indicators. Model selection is again applied using Autometrics and delivers the following parsimonious error correction
model (ECM):
ECM 
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0
1
2
ECM 
Cointegrating_Vector_1 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010-1
0
1
2
Cointegrating_Vector_1 
Cointegrating_Vector_2 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-2.5
0.0
2.5
Fig. 5. Error correction and cointegrating vector plots.
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.1.2. Single equation I(0) error-correction model
OLS, using observations 1965:2–2012:4 (T=191)
Dependent variable: DYoYGDP
ˇ t-ratio
DYoYCreditRE 0.225*** 2.7602
DYoYCreditR 1 0.091 1.1603
DYoYCreditR 4 0.382*** 5.1779
ImpD 1975 1 0.0445** 2.5557
ImpD 1979 3 0.0497*** 3.1923
StepD 1974 1 −0.0727*** −9.7356
StepD 1976 4 0.044*** 6.6015
StepD 1981 2 0.0401*** 7.3817
ECM 1 −0.691*** −12.4924
DYoYGDP 1 0.189*** 3.0897
DYoYGDP 2 0.376*** 6.3274
DYoYGDP 3 0.459*** 7.9243
SE of regression 0.015
Adjusted R-squared 0.570
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Diagnostic tests
R 1–5 test: F(5,173) =2.2037 [0.0561]
RCH 1–4 test: F(4,182) =1.6121 [0.1731]
ormality test: 2(2) = 1.8919 [0.3883]
etero test: F(17,170) =2.0336 [0.0119]*
etero-X test: F(38,149) =1.6926 [0.0141]*
ESET23 test: F(2,176) =0.0369 [0.9638]
The lagged error correction term (ECM 1) is of the expected sign, highly signiﬁcant and with a large coefﬁcient, implying
apid adjustment of GDP to changes in equilibrium caused by the growth of credit to the real economy, as described in Eq.
4). The long-term interest rate (LT Rate) falls out of the model (although it is captured in the ECM term) and the 1979q1
mpulse indicator also falls out. The 1st lag of DYoYCreditRE is not signiﬁcant but retained as part of the diagnostic testing
arried out by Autometrics. The constant is not retained in the model, but the step indicators act as a constant. Again the
odel passes all diagnostic tests at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
.2. Vector autoregressive and vector error correction modelling
One concern with the single equation ECM approach is that it is limited to discovering one cointegrating relationship
ut there may be multiple ones between these variables, as previous studies have found. In addition, this approach makes
mplicit assumptions about the endogeneity of the variables and there are concerns about reverse feedback from YoYGDP
o YoYCreditRE. This leads us to estimate a VAR for the above model.
.2.1. Unrestricted VAR model
Six lags of the endogenous variables are included to ensure no residual autocorrelation. Given the larger number of
arameters required for a multiple equation model with six lags, we drop the short-run bankrate variable which we have
lready seen to be relatively insigniﬁcant in the single-equation model. We again initially run indicator saturation across
ll variables in unrestricted form to ascertain signiﬁcant impulse and step dummies. We then estimate the VAR with an
nrestricted constant and indicators. The VAR is reasonably well speciﬁed, see Fig. 6 for the graphical diagnostics.
We then run the Johansen (Johansen and Juselius, 1990)multivariatemaximum-likelihood cointegration test to ascertain
he number of cointegrating vectors:
Johansen MLR test for cointegration
Unrestricted constant
Lags 6
Rank Trace test [Prob] Max test [Prob] Trace test (T-nm) Max test (T-nm)
0 126.72 [0.000]** 75.65 [0.000]** 110.72 [0.000]** 66.10 [0.000]**
** * ** *1 51.07 [0.000] 25.25 [0.010] 44.62 [0.000] 22.06 [0.035]
2 25.82 [0.001]** 24.44 [0.001]** 22.56 [0.003]** 21.36 [0.002]**
3 1.38 [0.240] 1.38 [0.240] 1.21 [0.272] 1.21 [0.272]
** Reject null hypothesis of a unit root at 1% signiﬁcance.
* Reject at 5% signiﬁcance.
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The trace and max eigenvalue tests suggest the existence of 2 cointegrating vectors at the 1% signiﬁcance level when
using an unrestricted constant and restricted trend.
4.2.2. Vector error correction model and tests for weak exogeneity
We re-estimate the model as a ‘vector error correction model’ (VECM) with a rank of 2, an unrestricted constant with no
trend and add the indicators in unrestricted form. The long-run cointegrating relations are given in Eq. (5):
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
ˆˇ YoYGDP YoYCreditRE YoYBroadmoney LT Rate
1 1(−)
−0.167
(0.049)
0
(−)
−0.005
(0.00)
2 1.226(0.41)
1
(−)
2.19
(0.28)
0
(−)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
[standard errors in brackets]
(5)
We can see in Fig. 5 (middle graph) that the ﬁrst cointegrating vector in Eq. (5) largely resembles the single equation
ECM (Eq. (4)), conﬁrming the validity of this approach. The second cointegrating vector (bottom graph of Fig. 5 and Eq.
(5)) suggests an equilibrium-correction relationship between Credit and Broadmoney growth which we would expect if we
accept the Quantity Theory of Credit approach – that loans create deposits. ADF-Cointegration tests ﬁnd both cointegrating
vectors are stationary.
We test the restriction that the ˛ coefﬁcients on YoYCreditRE are zero on both cointegrating vectors to test for weak
exogeneity of credit growth. This restriction is accepted at the 1% signiﬁcance level [2(2) =3.7096 [0.1565]].We then restrict
the short-run coefﬁcients on the long-term interest rate and YoYCreditRE jointly for weak exogeneity and this restriction is
also accepted at the 1% level [2(4) =5.7152 [0.2215]].
Finally, we test for weak exogeneity in the growth of Broadmoney. In this case the restriction that the ˛ coefﬁcient on
YoYBroadmoney is equal to zero is not accepted (although only at the 10% signiﬁcance level – 2(2) =6.9832 [0.0305]*),
and it would appear that there may be short-term feedback between Broadmoney and the other variables. As a result we
re-ran our single equation model dropping the contemporaneous value of YoYBroadmoney. This led to YoYBroadmoney and
Bankrate being retained in the ECM term but with insigniﬁcant t-values in the long-run static equation (−0.133 and 0.79)
and very tiny coefﬁcients, so makes little difference to our model.
From a theoretical perspective, short-term feedback from YoYBroadmoney could perhaps be seen as supporting the
portfolio-rebalancing or Post-Keynesian ‘liquidity-preference’ approach (Sections 2.3). The non-bank private sector and
households are likely in the short-term to adjust their holdings of deposits – switching in and out of higher yielding assets
such as bonds – according to economy-wide trends (Arestis and Howells, 1999).
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Table 2
Toda–Yamamoto Granger non-causality tests.
Dependent variable Excluded from VAR (with 6 lags) 2 P-value
YoYGDP YoYCreditRE 15.629 0.0159*
YoYGDP LT Rate 10.099 0.121
YoYGDP YoYBroadmoney 7.6436 0.265
YoYGDP ALL 39.984 0.002**
YoYCreditRE YoYGDP 7.6016 0.279
YoYCreditRE YoYBroadmoney 4.4784 0.612
YoYCreditRE LT Rate 15.377 0.018*
YoYCreditRE ALL 30.901 0.03*
YoYBroadmoney YoYGDP 10.134 0.1191
YoYBroadmoney YoYCreditRE 17.972 0.0063**
YoYBroadmoney LT Rate 15.025 0.0201*
YoYBroadmoney ALL 59.199 0.000**
LT Rate YoYGDP 12.689 0.0482*
LT Rate YoYCreditRE 8.0887 0.2317
LT Rate YoYBroadmoney 3.9699 0.6807
4
c
a
o
u
i
v
s
e
h
(
l
o
b
5
a
p
pLT Rate ALL 24.764 0.1316
* Exclusion rejected at 5% signiﬁcance level.
** Exclusion rejected at 1% signiﬁcance level.
Our ﬁnal restricted VECM is presented in Eq. (6), with standard errors in brackets:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ˆ˛ 1 2
YoYGDP
−0.49
(0.06)
0.032
(0.03)
YoYCreditRE
0
(−)
0
(−)
YoYBroadmoney
−0.063
(0.05)
0.111
(0.02)
LT Rate
0
(−)
0
(−)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ˆˇ YoYGDP YoYCreditRE YoYBroadmoney LT Rate
1
1
(−)
−0.148
(0.05)
0
(−)
−0.005
(0.00)
2
1.279
(0.31)
1
(−)
−1.634
(0.21)
0
(−)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(6)
.2.3. Testing for strong–exogeneity: Augmented Granger Causality tests
As our variables are non-stationary and/or cointegrated, we adopt the Toda–Yamamoto (1995) ‘augmented Granger
ausality test’, which involves adding an additional lag m to the VAR according to the mth order of integration to ensure
symptotic properties on the 2 test for the reduction. Using the original unrestricted VAR estimated in Section 4.2, we add
ne additional lag to the 6 that were originally estimated as our variables are all I(1). We keep the indicators and constant
nrestricted as before. The full VAR equations are available upon request. We then conduct Wald-tests on the variables of
nterest to test for Granger-non-causality and derive strong exogeneity.
The VAR augmented Granger-causality tests support our single-equation and VECM ﬁndings. YoYCreditRE is the only
ariable where exclusions of past occurrences are not accepted in determining the present value of YoYGDP. Meanwhile,
ince past occurrences of YoYCreditRE can be excluded from the YoYGDP VAR, we can say that YoYCreditRE is strongly
xogenous of YoYGDP as we showed in Section 4.2.2 that it was weakly exogenous. The same cannot be said of the LT Rate
owever, which ﬁts with our inclusion of this variable, albeit with a very weak coefﬁcient, in our error correction equations
Eqs. (4) and (6) and Table 2).
The 1% rejection of exclusions of YoYCreditRE on YoYBroadmoney again supports the Quantity of Credit-approach, that
oans create deposits, and the LT Rate also appears to have some inﬂuence. The LT Rate itself appears independent of the
ther variables with the exception of (nominal) YoYGDP which we would expect in a monetary policy regime which has
een mainly focused on inﬂation for most of the period under question.
. Conclusions and discussionThe relationship between monetary policy and output and the monetary policy transmission mechanism are contested
reas ofmacroeconomics, evenmore so following the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008. Different theoretical andmethodological
erspectives have led to diverging propositions concerning the relations between variables. Causality has been difﬁcult to
in down. At the same time, policy has undergone major shifts, reﬂecting both theory and practical experience.
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In this study, rather than constraining our empirical investigation by adopting any particular theoretical perspective,
we begin with a general unrestricted model (GUM) that encompasses a wide range of theories, including Monetarist, New
Keynesian, QE/portfolio re-balancing and credit approaches, with independent variables representing each approach tested
for their interaction with GDP growth in a single equation model.
This study provides a number of innovations. By examining the UK experience over a 50-year period, during which
multiple regime shifts and shocks took place, we can better examine underlying long-term relationships in a way that has
not previously been undertaken. The GETS approach essentially conducts a horse race between competing explanatory
variables in a dynamic setting. Variables that do not add explanatory power are dropped as insigniﬁcant. We check the
robustness of our single equation ﬁnding by estimating complementary VAR and VECM models which allows us to test for
the exogeneity of the variables.
The results suggest a long-run cointegrating relationship between the growth rate of nominal credit to the real economy
(non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and households) and the growth rate of nominal GDP (Fig. 7). Nominal GDP growth is shown to be
strongly exogenous of credit suggesting simultaneity is not a concern. This supports the Quantity Theory of Credit approach
whereby credit creation and allocation decisions by the banking sector have an independent impact on the real economy.
The research supports earlier empirical studies by Werner (1997, 2005), Voutsinas and Werner (2011) on Japan and Lyonnet
and Werner (2012) on the UK that show disaggregated bank credit creation for the real economy is the most important
predictor of nominal GDP growth when taking into account a wide-range of alternative monetary policy instruments and
variables. The ﬁndings also give further credence to an independent role for bank credit (shocks) in inﬂuencing nominal
output over and above aggregate demand shocks, supporting a number of recent VAR, panel and structural equation studies
by central banks (Lown and Morgan, 2006; Ciccarelli et al., 2010; Jiménez et al., 2012; Barnett and Thomas, 2013).
The fact that short-term interest rates drop out of themodel and long-term interest rates appear to have a relativelyweak
role raises questions about the efﬁcacy of the traditional central bank focus on targeting interest rates as the main tool of
monetary policy – supporting the ﬁndings of Werner and Zhu (2012) – whether by manipulation of the base rate, standard
open market operations or large scale asset purchases/QE operations. Since QE as practised in the UK effectively bypassed
the credit-creating banking system, relying instead on capital markets to buy corporate assets, this may be one explanation
for why QE did not enable a more rapid recovery from the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008. Since short-term interest rates are
eliminated in our horse race as failing to add explanatory power, the recent reversion of central bank policy from a focus
on quantities to the price of money (interest) even at the zero bound (negative interest, as adopted by the Swiss, Danish or
Japanese central banks) is misguided.Instead of focusing on interest rate policy, the central bank may wish to consider stimulating lending to the non-ﬁnancial
corporate sector more directly, which, excluding commercial real estate lending, has shown a steady decline (Fig. 8) since
the mid-1980s in relation to total lending17. A number of central banks have instituted ‘funding for lending’ schemes to
17 In Fig. 8, the Bank of England’s ‘industrial Analysis of MFI lending’ series (Interactive database codes RPQTB RPQT) is used. Non-ﬁnancial corporation
lending, also called ‘productive lending’ in Werner (2005), includes the following sectors: ‘manufacturing, water, agriculture, construction, hospitality,
transport, distribution andwholesale’. This series allows amore disaggregated breakdown of credit for GDP transactions, enabling us to remove commercial
real estate. However, it was not used for the main study as it is only available since 1986 and excludes non-UK resident bank lending.
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ncourage more bank lending to small and medium sized enterprises (Bank of Japan, 2014; European Central Bank, 2014).
ther ‘schemes’ that have been suggested include reducing capital requirements for SME-lending and raising them for
roperty-related lending (Turner, 2013b), purchasing securitised SME loans (Fleming, 2013), using QE to purchase bonds
rom a national investment bank or green investment bank (Ryan-Collins et al., 2013). A more permanent and preferable
ption would be to change the structure of the banking sector by introducing local banks focusing on SME lending, which
mounts to lending to the real economy (Werner, 2013a,b; Greenham and Prieg, 2015). The latter would appear to have
een an important factor in the enduring success of the German economy and its resilience during the recent crisis (Werner,
013a,b). Moreover, credit growth for GDP transactions, and hence nominal GDP growth, can also be enhanced by swapping
overnment bond-ﬁnance with borrowing from banks (‘Enhanced Debt Management’, Werner, 2014a).
Concerning a potential impact of the UK leaving the EU, two insights can be gleaned from our empirical ﬁndings:
irstly, UK nominal GDP growth is to a large extent determined by domestic factors, especially bank credit for GDP trans-
ctions. Policies to enhance such bank credit can and should be taken, irrespective of international trade or political union
rrangements. Secondly, the empirical methodology to detect structural breaks found no such break in the determinants
f nominal GDP growth when the UK joined the EU in Q1 1973. However, it is noticeable that the most signiﬁcant dummy
ariable is a step dummy starting from Q1 1974, which could reﬂect the delayed economic impact of EU entry. It is highly
igniﬁcant and has a negative sign (see Tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2).
A next step for this research would be to attempt a further disaggregation of the credit aggregate data, to wean out
ortgage credit that simply contributes to asset price inﬂation as opposed to translating into consumption. Looking at Fig. 7,
ith the exception of the highly unstable 1970s period, the periods in time when YoYCreditRE measure is higher than
oYGDP roughly correspond to the two housing booms in the 1980s and 2000–2007 periods, followed by periods where
redit growth was slower than output growth. Finally, if data was available, a cross-country panel study would test the
obustness of the ﬁndings across different institutional settings and monetary regimes.
Given our ﬁndings, it would seem that Benjamin Friedman’s comment cited at the beginning has been accurate: the
rofession – and more so, the people of many countries – have not been served well by a half century diversion of monetary
olicy away froma focus on credit quantities. It is high time policy-makers utilise the powerful role of bank credit in a fruitful
ay and for the common good.
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